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UNITED STATES V. OAKLEY: JUST TO MAKE
THE PRACTICE OF MILITARY LAW ALITTLE BIT HARDER
By
THEODORE A. BORRILLO*
HAROLD E. ROGERS, JR.**
INTRODUCTION

Advocacy is a skill and an art; easy to criticize, difficult to fairly appraise. Indeed, a post-mortem of criminal
trials, selected at random, would undoubtedly reveal flaws
of varying magnitude in the trial techniques of respected
members of the bar. Our profession is one in which hindsight is a meager measure of counsel's competency. Trial
strategy is seldom viewed with a uniform eye.'
An accused's right in military law to the effective assistance of
counsel 2 took a curious and questionable turn in the U.S. Army
Board of Review decision of United States v. Oakley.3 The decision
posed the following rather important questions, worthy of consideration and evaluation: (1) how serious must be the trial errors of
defense counsel to enable an accused to procure a new trial because
of inadequate' representation; and (2) to what extent should trial
defense counsel be permitted to exercise his own judgment about
trial tactics?
I. A CONFINING APPROACH To REPRESENTATIO1
In the Oakley case the accused asserted on appeal that he had
been inadequately represented at trial. 4 The accused, Chief Warrant Officer Andrew W. Oakley, was convicted of stealing $688.00
in military payment certificates in violation of Article 121, Uniform
Code of Military Justice. On the date of the offense the accused
had been designated as finance officer to pay certain Army personnel and proceeded to the post finance officer to pick up his bag
of money. He signed a receipt for the 'amount of money contained
in the bag. Upon completion of his duty as pay officer he returned
the bag of money left over from unpaid personnel to the post finance officer, but was unable to account for the sum of $688.00. He
later confessed to criminal investigation agents that he had incurred
a number of debts, that he had written checks which had been returned by the bank for lack of sufficient funds, and that he had
taken the $688.00 from the payroll to cover these debts.
.Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law.
**Member of California Bar and San Francisco low firm of Cushing, Cullinan, Hancock & Rothert.
1 United States v. Stoecker, 216 F.2d 51,'52(7th Cir. 1954).
2 The rights accorded to an accused by the Uniform Code of Military Justice closely parallel those
rights accorded to defendants in civilian courts. For example, the defendant has the right to be
informed of the charges against him, to be confronted by witnesses testifying against him, not to be
compelled to incriminate himself, and the right to be repiesented by counsel. Right to counsel in
military law is a two-fold right which
includes the right to appointed counsel throughout the proceed2
ing, Arts. 27, 32b, 38b, c and e, 4 a, 46 and 70, UCMJ: MCM, 1951, paras. 6, pp. 9-12, 46a and b,
p. 67-68, 61f(), pp. 86-87, and 102a, pp. 172-73, and the right to his effective assistance, United
tates v. Gardner, 9 USCMA 48, 25 CMR 310 (1958). The right to effective assistence of counsel is not
satisfied by a mere formal appointment of counsel, and where counsel's conduct at triclis considered
inadequate, reversal of the conviction is warranted. United States v. Gardner, supra.
3 CM 398074, Oakley, 25 CMR 624 (1958). In researching a point of military law, the authors
"accidentally" came across the disturbing Oakley precedent. Since the case had escaped comment in
legal periodicals (as do so many interesting military law decisions), and because of its dangerous
implications, the authors felt it warranted comment, even at this late date.
4 Id. at 625.
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During the course of the pretrial interview the accused stated
to his counsel, among other things, that the confession was the product of duress, but was never able to convince him that it was inadmissable. Trial defense counsel questioned the criminal investigators who took the statement and became convinced that there
was no merit to the accused's contention of duress or to a later claim
that he had requested counsel during the CID 5 investigation. Counsel was aware that the prosecution would bring in two experienced
CID investigators who took the statement and a military police
captain who heard virtually the entire interrogation to refute any
claim by the accused that he had been placed under duress or had
asked for or had been denied counsel. Counsel therefore concluded
that there was little prospect of excluding the statement and that
at best an unsuccessful effort along that line would be only a waste
of time.
Counsel was also aware that the evidence of accused's guilt
apart from his confession was quite convincing. Two witnesses
from the military finance office where the accused received his bag
of money testified that the amount placed in the bag had been
checked and double checked, that the accused had signed and acknowledged receipt for sums including the amount he was short,
and that the chance for there to be an error in the amount of money
placed in the bag was extremely remote.6
With the assent of the accused, counsel arranged to have Mr.
Oakley examined by an Army psychiatrist of considerable experience in the field of criminal insanity. On the basis of Mr. Oakley's
statements to him the psychiatrist concluded that the accused took
the money because of an irresistable impulse 7 and would have done
so if the risk of detection were extremely high.8 However, other
Army psychiatrists came to the opposite point of view.9
In light of the otherwise overwhelming evidence of the accused's guilt, counsel determined that the most promising strategy
would be to defend on the ground of temporary insanity. The accused assented to this strategy. Counsel further determined that it
would be bad strategy to challenge the voluntariness of the confession. Not only would a strong rebuttal by three prosecution witnesses be brought to bear against a claim of involuntariness, but in
addition evidence of the larceny independent of the confession was
quite strong. The most important reason for not challenging the
confession was that it would without doubt jeopardize the defense
of irresistable impulse. First of all, the court most likely would
5 Criminal Investigation Department.
6 Record, 3 October 1957, pp. 8-25, CM 398074, Oakley, supra note 3.
7 In military low "a person is not mentally responsible in a criminal sense for an offense unless
he was, at the time, so far free from mental defect, disease, or derangement as to be able concerning
the particular act charged both to distinguish right from wrong and to adhere to the right." Para.
120b, MCM, 1951, 200. (Emphasis added.)
8 To establish irresistable impulse it must appear that "the compulsion generated by the illness
was so strong that the act would have been committed even though the circumstances were such that
the accused could expect to be detected and apprehended forthwith when the offense was committed."
U.S. Dep'ts of the Army and Air Force, Psychiatry in Military Law, TM 8-240, AFM 160-42, p. 5 (1953).
If the medical officer is satisfied that the accused would not have committed the act had the circumstances been such that immediate detection and apprehension was certain, he will not testify that the
act occurred as the result of an 'irresistable impulse.' No impulse that can be resisted in the presence
of a high risk of detection or apprehension is really very 'irresistable'." Id. at 6. For an interesting
and well written opinion concerning the defense of irresistable impulse, see United States v. Smith,
5 USCM9 314, 17 CMR 314 (1954).
9 Although three psychiatrists had concluded that the accused was, at the time of the alleged
offense, capable of adhering to the right, only one of these psychiatrists testified at trial.
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question the sincerity of accused's claims regarding his sanity if he
attempted to hide an admission of his guilt, and might doubt the
truthfulness of his claims if his testimony concerning the voluntariness of the confession were soundly refuted by three strong prosecution witnesses. Moreover, a frank and open admission that the
larceny had in fact been committed was more consistent with the
theory that the accused would have committed the larceny realizing
that the risk of detection was extremely high, than would be an attempt to obscure or deny the fact that he had committed the larceny.
The court found the accused guilty and therefore sane at the
time of the offense. However, it is probable that the defense psychiatrist did cast some doubt on the sanity of the accused, in that
the sentence of confinement awarded was six months when it could
have been five years.' 0
On appeal Mr. Oakley urged, among other things, that he had
been denied adequate representation in that counsel had failed to
challenge the voluntariness of the confession after his suggestion
to do so. The Board of Review agreed with Mr. Oakley, asserting
that " . . . counsel is under a duty, if his client requests, to raise the
issue of the voluntariness of defendant's confession, despite counsel's own considered professional opinion that such action will produce no substantially beneficial result.""
II. THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION
The harmful effects which the Oakley decision might produce
are several. If the rule of the case were followed it would have a
tendency to stifle the initiative and responsibility of trial defense
counsel. It would seem that counsel is important to an accused not
simply because of his knowledge of the law, but because of his
ability to weigh various theories of defense and to select the best.
The United States Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama12 spelled
out the importance of having counsel in a criminal trial. The accused is usually unfamiliar with the rules of evidence, he lacks the
skill and knowledge to prepare his defense and requires the guiding
hand of counsel at every step in the proceeding. In fact, he faces
the danger of conviction because he does not know how to estab13
lish his innocence.
2

10 Para. 1 7c, MCM, 1951, 223.
11 Supra note 3 at 625. (Emphasis added.)
12 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
38 Ibid.
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It is submitted that legally trained counsel is provided for the
accused at a general court-martial not because of his familiarity
with the law alone, but because of the quality of his judgment
about how best to establish the innocence of his client. Cases are
not won on defense by indiscriminate presentation of every conceivable claim or defense. 14 Yet does the Oakley court mean to imply that all of these claims must be presented to the court even
though counsel knows from experience with the court and similar
cases that the accused's position probably would be jeopardized if
the claims were presented rather than withheld?
It is the task of trial defense counsel to use his training and his
experience to select from among the myriad of defense claims those
best calculated to further the interests of his client-either to establish his innocence or to reduce the punishment. If the accused
were competent to make all the judgments of trial strategy he
would not need counsel. And if the task of counsel is to further the
best interests of his client, then it would seem that he should not
be placed in a straight jacket by a rule of law which makes it error
for him to exercise his judgment. He must be given the responsibility for the presentation of his client's case and the attendant
freedom to mould together the facts and theories of defense which
will be most beneficial to the accused.
It is most probable that had trial defense counsel followed the
accused's suggestion to challenge the confession, he would have
done his client a disservice. In effect he would have been asking
the court to give equal credence to inconsistent claims. Can it therefore be sensibly urged that counsel inadequately represented Mr.
Oakley when he failed to challenge the confession-an issue on
which the testimony of his client would have become suspect and
serious doubts created as to the sincerity of a plea of insanity?
III.

THE PROBLEM OF UNWARRANTED APPEALS

The Oakley decision again raises the problem of excessive and
frivilous appeals that the United States Court of Military Appeals
and the federal courts have tried to avoid. The tendency of a convicted person to hunt for a scapegoat has often resulted in his pointing a denunciatory finger at his counsel, and to speculate that pursuance of a different course might have altered the results of his
trial. Now, every time an accused has made a request upon his
counsel, or perhaps simply a suggestion to follow a certain line
of strategy and counsel failed to comply, his hopes for a new trial
will be sharply increased. It takes little imagination to envision
how the number of reversible cases under such circumstances
would multiply. And no measure exists to determine how many
trial defense counsel will act contrary to their better judgment by
following unwise suggestions by their clients for fear of reversal
and censure by an appellate court. And might some counsel be
tempted to use the Oakley ruling as a "tactic," in an effort to reserve for his client a possible basis for a retrial in the event of conviction?
14 Every counsel is familiar with the type of accused who has an excuse for everything, who
suggests some or innumerable ways to "beat the rap."
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IV. A

MISAPPLIED RULE OF CIVIL LAW

A disturbing aspect of the Oakley decision is that the Board,
as a basis for its conclusion that Mr. Oakley deserved a new trial,
relied principally upon an old rule of civil law which states that
... an attorney has the duty to present to the court all claims of
his client, unless he knows them to be false."' , A close examination
of these cases shows that the rule was not applied to criminal cases
in determining whether the defendant was entitled to a rehearing,
but rather was a rule of civil law permitting the defendant to sue
for civil damages. 16
V.

THE "EMPTY GESTURE" TEST

In addition to being a rule foreign to criminal law, the Board
of Review decision is questionable in that it departs from the traditional test applied to inadequate representation cases by federal
criminal courts and the United States Court of Military Appeals.
In the case of United States v. Hunter17 the USCMA adopted the
rather strict federal rule of Diggs v. Welch', in judging claims of
inadequate representation. Courts haye repeatedly held that military due process does not guarantee "perfect" counsel.19 Indeed,
there are few trials free from mistakes of counsel. . 1' Before a new
trial will be granted the accused must show that ".

.

. the proceed-

ings by which he was convicted were so erroneous as to constitute
a ridiculous and empty gesture, or were so tainted with negligence
or wrongful motives on the part of his counsel as to manifest a complete absence of judicial character."'
In the Hunter opinion the
court called for a strict adherence to this standard lest every unsuccessful representation be urged as a basis for reversal.2 2 Since
a convict is not subject to prosecution for perjury, a liberal interpretation of this rule might encourage a flood of petitions from
15 Supra note 3 at 625.
16 The annotations in 56 A.L.R. 953 (1928) and 45 A.L.R.2d 17 (1956) discuss a number of old state
civil cases (Mass. 1811, Pa. 1841, Ind. 1859, Tex. 1889, Cal. 1918, Ark. 1933, and Minn. 1942) wherein
clients were permitted to recover damages from former attorneys where the attorney had been negligent
in the prosecution of the case. A typical case was where the client had given instructions to his attorney to sue on a note by a certain date and the attorney failed to follow instructions and let the
statute of limitations run. The only criminal case which the Board of Review cites, Jackson v. United
States, 221 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1955), states that a stipulation of fact made by counsel out of his
client's hearing and without his consent is not binding an his client. This holding does not seem
particularly relevant to the question of whether counsel must challenge a confession if requested to do
so. And in that regard, the military rule is that an accused is bound by stipulations made in open
court by his counsel during the course of trial if he does not object. United States v. Swigert, 8 USCMA
468, 24 CMR 278 (1957). Also, in the Boese case, ACM S-3923, 6 CMR 608, 609 n. 1 (1952), the court
states that "...
it may be assumed that defense counsel has performed his duties properly, has
advised the accused of his rights and the law affecting his case, and that for reasons best known to
them, they desire to pursue a certain course (para. 53h, MCM 1951). Accused is charged with knowledqe
of the legal implications of defense counsel's conduct of the defense, even though the same may, in
retrospect, seem ill-advised ...
"
17 2 USCMA 37, 6 CMR 37 (1952).
18 148 F.2d 667, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1945). In setting out the test, the court stated that the petitioner
must show a violation of his constitutional right to a fair trial under the due process clause; and
counsel's mistakes at trial will be only one of the factors which the court will consider in determining
whether the trial amounted to "a farce and a mockery of justice."
19 E.g., United States v. Bigger, 2 USCMA 297, 8 CMR 97 (1953). In United States v. Hunter, supra
note 17 at 41, 6 CMR at 41, the USCMA stated, "Undoubtedly, it would be desirable to furnish every
accused with a mature and experienced trial lawyer but that is presently an impossibility. The best
that can be done is to assure appointment of officers who are reasonably well qualified to protect
their substantial rights." (Emphasis added.)
20 See generally note 25 infra.
21 United States v. Hunter, supra note 17 at 41, 6 CMR at 41.
"22Ibid.
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disappointed prisoners which appellate courts would be required

to hear. 23 In cases where the United States Supreme Court has
granted a writ of habeas corpus for inadequate representation, the
circumstances surrounding the trial have shocked the conscience of
the court and made the proceedings a farce and a mockery of justice.2 4 Though the USCMA has become divided over the application of the Hunter rule in certain recent cases, it has uniformly applied that test to claims of inadequate representation.2 5 And although some other recent decisions suggest a slight modification of
the Hunter rule,26 not one has stepped as dangerously far afield as
the Oakley case.

VI.

THE IMPONDERABLES OF TRIAL TACTICS

The considerations that form the basis for a tactical decision
"are of such subtle nature that their application is as varied as
grains of sand on the ocean floor. ' 27 The court went on to say, "It
is this elusive quality which distinguishes the office lawyer from
the advocate. It would be capricious and foolhardy for any appellate body to proceed to the trial forum in retrospect there, and
with precisely drawn lines, distinguish between the varying shades
23 Diggs v. Welch, supra note 18 at 669-70. There the court stated, "It is well known that the
drafting of petitions for habeas corpus has become a game in many penal institutions. Convicts are
not subect to the deterrents of prosecution for perjury . . . The opportunity to try his former lawyer
has its undoubted attractions to a disappointed prisoner. [Writing down his allegations, even though
he knows they will not be believed, gives the prospect of a hearing and relief from monotony.] To
allow a prisoner to try the issue of the effectiveness of his counsel under a liberal definition of that
phrase is to give every convict the privilege of opening a Pandora's box of accusations which trial
courts near large penal institutions would be compelled to hear."
24 Id. at 670; Powell v. Alabama, supra note 12; United States v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561 (1953);
Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940).
25 In United States v. Bigger, supra note 19, the USCMA rejected accused's claim of inadequate
representation. However, a new trial was granted in United States v. Walker, 3 USCMA 355, 12 CMR
111 (1953) where appointed counsel conceded accused's guilt in a murder case after individual counsel
had presented a forceful defense based on the theory of accident. There the court felt that appointed
counsel had been so grossly negligent as to come within the "exceptional situation recognized in the
Hunter case." In rejecting a claim of inadequacy in United States v. Soukup, 2 USCMA 141, 7 CMR 17
(1953), the USCMA stated that there had been no showing that counsel was obviously incompetent and
that the accused's argument simply invited an appellate trial of the professional judgment of his
counsel.
The USCMA agreed with the accused that his counsel was inadequate in United States v. Parker,
6 USCMA 75, 19 CMR 201 (1955). The accused had been sentenced to death and the court enumerated
a great variety of deficiencies on the part of counsel which convinced it that the proceedings manifested a "complete absence of judicial character." United States v. McMahon, 6 USCMA 709, 21 CMR
31 (1956) was another death sentence case which the court decided in the same manner as the Parker
case, supra. The court analyzed inadequacy in terms of due process and noted that any such appeal
would be rejected where it showed nothing more than that on hindsight there is a difference of
opinion regarding choice of tactics.
In three recent cases, United States v. Allen, 8 USCMA 604, 25 CMR 8 (1957), United States v.
Armell, 8 USCMA 513, 25 CMR 17 (1957), and United States v. Elkins, 8 USCMA 611, 25 CMR 115
(1958), the court with Judge Latimer dissenting sent the cases back to the Board of Review for factfinding determinations on the issue of inadequacy where counsel presented no evidence of mitigation
and made no argument following pleas of guilty. In the Elkins case, counsel contended that the
accused desired no mitigation to be presented, and Judge Latimer noted that it would indeed be a
bad rule of law where a "lawyer may be damned if he argues against the will of an accused or
damned if he doesn't." In that regard, the USCMA decided in United States v. Gardner, supra note 1,
that counsel was inadequate where he permitted the accused to take the stand and present evidence
which filled the gaps in the prosecution's case. The court rejected three recent appeals of the Allen type
where no mitigation was presented following a plea of guilty. United States v. Friborg, 8 USCMA 515,
25 CMR 19 (1957); United States v. Williams, 8 USCMA 552, 25 CMR 56 (1957); United States v.
Sarlouis, 9 USCMA 148, 25 CMR 410 (1958). There the court reasoned that to present mitigation would
bring forth harmful rebuttal and that counsel is not required to choose a course which may result in
prejudice to his client.
26 In United States v. Bigger, supra note 19 at 302, 8 CMR at 102, while the court applied the
Hunter rule, it indicated that perhaps an accused had to make an even stronger showing of inadequate
representation by its remark, '... The most we can command is that [defense counsel] . . .well
and truly, and within their capabilities represent the accused." Nevertheless, decisions for some time
thereafter applied the "empty gesture" test. See generally note 25 supra. However, in United States v.
Horne, 9 USCMA 601, 26 CMR 381, 384 (1958), the USCMA noted, "By that broad language [Hunter
rule] we did not intend to be understood as saying that the highest degree of professional competency
is not to be expected of an appointed counsel." And in a similar vein, in United States v. Kraskouskas,
9 USCMA 607, 610, 26 CMR 387, 390, a decision handed down the same day as the Home ruling, the
USCMA said, "The constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel . . . demands a professional
and requisite standard of skill. A fair standard of professional competence must be a necessary condition precedent with the professional undertaking of the defense of a person on trial for a crime."
27 CM 360555, Costillo-Acevedo, 12 CMR 318, 324 (1952).
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of the advocate's art. ' 28 Any quick condemnation of counsel should
therefore be avoided. 29 For while it is an easy task to second guess
a lawyer, consideration must be given to the fact that he is in possession of information which never appears in the record. For example he must assess the credibility of the witnesses, including his
client, and the record is usually barren on their trustworthiness.
Certainly, a lawyer would think twice before sponsoring a witness
who is hostile, ill-tempered, "smart-alecky," or prone to being "cornered" by cross-examination. The validity of testimony, and the
theory of the case, often turns not only on what has been said-but
the way it is said.30 Also, the thoroughness of trial counsel and the
zeal with which he pursues the prosecution of the case will affect
a trial defense counsel's strategy. While the accused Oakley could
have taken the stand for the limited purpose of testifying as to the
voluntariness of his confession 3' the decision by counsel not to pursue this course might very well have been based on imponderables
outside the record. And might the suggested course, if pursued,
have adversely affected the court in view of its apparant inconsistency with the main line of defense,
and the presence of other
32
overwhelming evidence of guilt?

Perhaps had the court been apprised in the Oakley case of all
the factors which influenced counsel, it would not have disagreed
with him in his decision not to challenge the confession.
There are cases in the area of "inadequate representation"
where the record often proves adequate. For example, where trial
defense counsel has a loyalty to two accused whose interests are
conflicting, 33 or where the court has interfered with counsel's attempt at effective representation. 34 The area of trial tactics, however, is one of speculation and conjecture and should not be tampered with unless the "four corners of the record" make the efforts
of counsel appear to have been an "empty gesture."
28 Ibid.
29 CM 398157, Withey, 25 CMR 593, 596 (1957).
30 In discussing the importance of cross-examination, the distinguished advocate, Lloyd Paul
Stryker, in his work The Art of Advocacy (1954), on page 87, states, "The general deportment of the
witness . . . will give you many clues. Did he hesitate. Did he look off into space? Did he moisten
his lips and seem perturbed? Did he stammer and needlessly repeat himself? Was there an honest or
shifty expression on his face as he answered? And above all, what is your impression as to how the
iury reacted to him? Did they seem to believe him or were there some jurors, at least, whose
expressions spelled incredulity?"
31 MCM, 1951, paras. 53i, p. 75, 140a, p. 250, and 149b(1), pp. 279-80.
32 In United States v. McMahan, 6 USCMA 709, 21 CMR 31, 45 (1956) (concurring opinion), Judge
Quinn suggests that in appraising inadequacy of representation claims the court should consider "the
overwhelming evidence of guilt." The results of the Oakley retrials lend support to this conclusion.
In the two retrials of Oakley (the Board of Review in 27 CMR 560 (1958) reversed the second conviction), though the voluntar:ncss of his confess on was put in issue, he was convicted. Records, 27 May
1958 and 2 December 1958. CM 398074, Oakley. The third conviction was affirmed by the Board of
Review in 28 CMR 451 (1959) and by the United States Court of Military Appeals in 11 USCMA 187,
29 CMR 3 (1960). Adequacy of representation, however, was an issue only in Oakley's first appeal.
33 E.g., United States v. Faylor, 9 USCMA 547, 26 CMR 327 (1958). There the two co-accused were
tried for wrongful appropriation of a motor vehicle and were represented by the same counsel. Pleas
of guilty were entered and no evidence was presented on the merits. After findings, defense counsel
made an unsworn statement on behalf of both accused. He proceeded to point out that the appellant's
co-accused (who did not appeal) was only 18 years old and had never been convicted of any offense,
and that the appellant was the leader and motivating force of the offense. The court held that
appellant was the leader and motivating force of the offense, and that the appellant had been denied
effective representation, in that trial defense counsel was buying sympathy for the co-accused at the
expense of the appellant. Cf. United States v. Lovett, 7 USCMA 704, 23 CMR 168 (1957), where prior
representation
of government witness by trial defense counsel conflicted with interests of the accused.
4
Para. 8c, MCM, 1951, 68 requires that defense counsel "guard the interests of the accused by all
honorable and legitimate means known to law. It is his duty . . . to represent the accused with
undivided fidelity, and not to divulge his secrets or confidence." In areas where there is a doubt
concerning the equivocal conduct of counsel, it "must be regarded as having been antagonistic to the
best interests of h:s client." United States v. McClusky, 6 USCMA 545, 550, 20 CMR 266, (1955).
34 E.g., ACM S-3514, Mathis, 6 CMR 661 (1952) (interference with right to make closing argument).
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CONCLUSION

Trial defense counsel should not be hamstrung in their efforts
to present the best possible defense. Sufficient protection against
an inadequate defense can be provided by the Hunter rule, for if
the accused discovers during the course of preparation for trial that
he simply cannot agree with or trust the judgment of his counsel,
he may acquire new counsel. And rejection of the Oakley rule
would not be inconsistent with the requirement that the accused
make the final decision of whether to plead guilty and of what evidence to permit in by stipulation. But to permit the accused a new
trial simply because his counsel failed to present one of his claims
to the court would seem to be an anomoly in criminal law. Once a
considered determination has been made by trial defense counsel
as to tactics, a second guessing at an appellate level should be indulged in with great caution lest speculation as to "what might
have been" may result in guessing a competent counsel into incompetency.
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